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FURTHERING JUSTICE BY IMPROVING THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND MAKING
LAWYERS MORE ACCOUNTABLE
Roger C. Cramton*
I. THE INDIDUAL COMPONENT
Conceptions of legal ethics, William Simon tells us, are "dispiriting"
to law students and lawyers because they fail to respond to the
normative aspirations that led most of us to study and practice law.'
The moral appeal of the lawyering role rests on the ideal that
"lawyers, not just in exceptional moments of public service, but in
their everyday practice, participate directly in furthering justice."2
Yet the most common conception of legal ethics equates being an
ethical lawyer with conforming to the minimal requirements of the
ethics codes (or at least those parts of the codes that the profession
takes seriously and enforces). An alternate conception allows lawyers
to express their personal values in representation by exercising the
discretion conferred on them by such rules as those governing choice
of client, exceptions to confidentiality, and withdrawal. Everyday
practice, however, pushes the conscientious lawyer to engage in
conduct that is unfair and unjust. Although the discretionary
loopholes provide an out, they can be exercised only at great cost and
must be taken on personal and subjective grounds exercised without
the profession's guidance or support.
The profession's only answer to the lawyer's frustration is the claim
that in the long run the current conceptions of the lawyer's role in the
adversary system serve public values by producing socially desirable
and "just" decisions. Justice is equated with the outcomes of process.
At the governmental level, justice depends primarily on two things:
first, institutions, laws and procedures that produce reasonably fair
outcomes through elections, lawmaking and dispute resolution; and
second, a reasonably fair distribution of opportunities. We still have a
long way to go in these respects even though, compared with many
other societies, our situation is relatively favorable.
*Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School. Comments and
corrections are welcomed: <rccl0@cornell.edu>.
1. William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. Legal Educ. 65 (1991).
2. Id. at 66.
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It is wrong, however, to conceive of justice solely in terms of what
the state does. Justice is furthered or hampered by the state's
institutions, rules and practices, but justice is not limited to, or defined
solely by, the institutions and actions of the state. Many years ago, I
learned from Tom Shaffer's writing and example that justice is a gift
that good people give one another by how they treat each other.
Each of us as individuals, and especially as lawyers, by acting justly
and fairly, creates justice. Justice is created or destroyed in countless
ways every day: by our actions; by how we treat others; by how we
adapt to, or shape, or blindly conform to the familiar routines of our
workplace. By putting the Golden Rule into action, while living a life
dedicated to studying, living and improving the law, one helps "to
repair the world."4
Thus, the individual component is a vital part of practicing law "in
the interests of justice." Many law teachers, numerous law school
courses and thousands of lawyers bring justice to life (and, I believe,
restore God's presence in the world) by what they do in the every day
practice of law. In every way possible we should attempt to inspire
and encourage "good lawyers"5 to have the passion, commitment and
courage to repair the world as they practice law.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENT
If all lawyers, except for a few bad apples, acted in a manner
designed to result in a more perfect justice, nothing more would need
to be said. But we know that most lawyers do not accept a
responsibility to act in this manner. Instead, the operative goal of
most practitioners (echoed by much of what is taught in law school) is
to "win" for the client (and for one's own self-esteem and monetary
reward) without getting sanctioned by a judge, disciplined by the bar,
3. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Justice in Everyday Life, 22 Res Gestae 394,397 (1978)
("Justice is the gift we give one another as we go about living under the law, and as we
go about making the law fit our lives. Our truthfulness in doing this is where justice
comes from."); Thomas L. Shaffer, Some Problems in the Administration of Justice in
a Secularized Society (Response), 31 Mercer L. Rev. 459,461-65 (1980).
4. Tikkun olum, "to repair the world," is a Jewish tradition concerning the
responsibilities of a chosen people-the moral responsibility of the chosen to repair
the world by everyday actions that are just. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Susan P.
Koniak & Roger C. Cramton, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 1064 (3d ed. 1999). I
believe that lawyers are also a chosen people in that they have a special responsibility
to promote and maintain just legal institutions and further just results in legal
proceedings.
5. Bruce Green restated the "ordinary morality" of the good lawyer in a
conversation with his nine-year-old son describing what he was going to tell the
attendees at a conference on lawyer professionalism: "treat each other with respect";
"be honest, keep your word, do your best, think about whether what you are doing is
right or wrong"; "[d]o not neglect your family, do not spend all your time working";
and "[t]ry to make the world a better place." To each his son replied, "Doesn't
everyone know that?" Conference Proceedings, Transcript from Professionalism
Conference, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 481, 543 (2001) (remarks of Bruce Green).
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or exposed to civil or criminal liabilities. In short, Holmes' "bad
man"6 is the typical American lawyer whose only concern is how far
he can go in winning for the client without incurring the wrath of the
law or harmful damage to reputation.
How do I know that this is the prevailing ethic? The finding cannot
be based on extensive and reliable social science studies. Most of the
relevant conduct takes place in private and is protected by the
professional duty of confidentiality; and law schools, foundations and
governments have evidenced little interest in studying what lawyers
actually do. Yet the legal profession itself provides evidence
convincing to me by telling us how it behaves in various contexts. In
negotiation, actual fraud is to be avoided, but there is no duty to be
candid and deception abounds.7 It is permissible for a lawyer
representing a business client to include provisions known to be illegal
or unenforceable in adhesion contracts drafted for use in consumer
transactions.' In litigation, taking advantage of a pansy, using delay as
a litigation tactic, running up the costs of an opposing party to achieve
a more favorable settlement, and so forth, are acceptable and
pervasive conduct.9 Although "zealous advocacy" has been banished
from the black letter of the ABA Model Rules, the concept is
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 Harv. L
Rev. 457,459 (1897).
7. See Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does Telling the Truth Have Its
Limits?, 2 Inside Litig. 1 (1988), reprinted in Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban,
Legal Ethics 421 (1995) (describing the views of several negotiation experts on a
number of common situations involving deception and lack of candor); see also Gary
Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthfid Bargaining by Lawyers, 2
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411 (1988); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical
Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926.
8. See William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A
Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 799,833 (1993) (criticizing
the ABA's rejection of a rule that would have prohibited inclusion of a provision in
an agreement that "the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal, contains
legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be unconscionable
as a matter of law") (emphasis omitted)); see also Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra
note 4, at 1127-56.
9. See, eg., Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal
Profession 82-95 (2000) [hereinafter Rhode, Interests of Justice]. One empirical study
contains an even grimmer finding. A substantial group of Michigan and federal court
litigators were asked about their behavior when learning, shortly before entering
settlement negotiations with the opposing lawyer, that the client gave knowingly false
evidence on a material issue in his deposition. Sixty percent of the litigators
responded that this information need not be disclosed to the other side if the client
refused to authorize the disclosure. Steven D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations:
Interim Report for ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards and
ABA House of Delegates (1983), reprinted in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L
Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation 206 (1985). The
situation, of course, is one in which the prevailing ethics rules require the lawyer to
disclose the perjury if the client refuses to do so. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct
R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
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considered by most lawyers to be the lawyer's most sacred duty. °
True, older attitudes of cooperation with the adversary continue in
some arenas of small-stakes litigation or in criminal defense of the
non-wealthy, but these settings involve individual clients, usually
inexperienced and poor. Numerous studies show that plaintiffs'
lawyers in civil cases" and underpaid defense counsel in criminal
cases12 often sacrifice their clients' interests in favor of quick
settlements or guilty pleas that maximize the lawyer's effort/earnings
calculus.
The tide of practice today, whatever it was in the past, is toward a
"total commitment to client" hired-gun model that abandons
conscience and runs rough-shod over the older notion that the lawyer
is an officer of the court who is concerned with the maintenance and
improvement of the sound administration of justice. The profession's
formal ethics rules "represent nothing more than 'the lowest common
denominator of conduct that a highly self-interested group will
tolerate"'; 3 they place little restraint on abusive litigation conduct and
provide little guidance on what is appropriate moral conduct in any
practice setting.
This "demoralization" of the professional role 4 is evidenced in a
1998 study of the ethics of corporate defense litigators. 5 The purpose
10. Model Rule 1.3 states, "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." R. 1.3. The comment to Rule 1.3 adds that "[a]
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." R. 1.3 cmt.
11. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 96-116
(1974) (describing the common process by which contingent fee lawyers persuade
their clients to accept an early settlement that is in the lawyer's interest but not the
client's).
12. See, e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, Criminal Justice: Issues and Ironies 242-46
(2d ed. 1979) (describing defense counsel in criminal cases as engaged in a
"confidence game"); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11
J. Conflict Resol. 52, 68-69 (1967) (describing the cooperation between prosecutors
and defense attorneys, cooperation that may become destructive "where cooperation
may shade off into collusion"); see also Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 9, at
61-63.
13. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 909 (1999); see
also Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 1211.
14. Two old-fashioned professional models-the wise counselor in law office
transactions and the prudent and effective advocate in the court-emphasized the
moral content and public aspect of these roles. The ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics stated that it was a "false claim.., that it is the duty of the lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." Canons of Prof'l
Ethics Canon 15 (1908). The lawyer, Canon 15 said, "must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client." Id. Moral aspirations were carried forward in the Ethical
Considerations of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, see, e.g.,
Model Code of Profl Responsibility EC 7-8, 7-9, & 7-10 (1981); however, it is by no
means clear that these aspirations have been met in everyday practice.
15. Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 691 (1998). For
especially insightful portions of the study, see Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Introduction:
1602 [Vol. 70
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of the study, funded by the ABA Section of Litigation, was to gain a
better understanding of the forces that shape decision-making by large
firm corporate defense litigators and lead them to engage in
problematic or improper conduct. The ethical climate in which these
lawyers work is not one of frequent violations of clear law, except with
respect to the common practice of fee padding. " A clear law violation
occurs from time to time, as in the many reported instances of lawyers
cheating their partners or clients or being sanctioned for egregious
discovery abuses.17 But such deviance, apart from bill padding, is
relatively rare in large law firms and is viewed as a problem of
individual aberration, a "bad apples" problem. What does occur is a
constant pushing of the envelope with respect to the norms of
practice. The vague limits of the partisan norms of the adversary
system result in a continuing effort to gain an advantage, to suppress
the truth from coming out, and to win for the client."8
Attention to the functioning of the system or to the justice of
outcomes is secondary at best. Ethics is a matter of steering, if
necessary, just clear of the few unambiguous prohibitions found in
rules governing lawyers, i.e., that which is not unlawful is required if
the client wants it.19
Why does this happen? Both partners and associates are terribly
insecure in a highly competitive world of demanding and transient
clients. Lawyers who are considered to be among the most powerful
in the profession talk of themselves as helpless victims of forces they
cannot control.?° They are caught in a rat race that makes money and
status the only shared goals. Because clients are uninterested in moral
Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 Fordham L
Rev. 697 (1998), and the more detailed individual reports of Robert W. Gordon, The
Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 Fordham L.
Rev. 709 (1998), Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery, Process as a Circle of Blame.:
Institutiona Professionah and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to
Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham
L. Rev. 773 (1998), and Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of
Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 Fordham L
Rev. 809 (1998).
16. See, eg., Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and
Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 205 (1998) (discussing sixteen
cases in which prominent lawyers were punished for billing and expense fraud);
William G. Ross, The Ethics of Time Based Billing by Attorneys, 58 Ala. Law. 40, 41
(1997) ("[H-lalf of outside counsel and two-thirds of inside counsel estimated that at
least ten percent of the work done by lawyers is motivated more by a desire to inflate
hours than by a desire to service the real needs of the client."); see also Rhode,
Interests of Justice, supra note 9, at 168-78.
17. See Lerman, supra note 16. One frequently discussed judicial decision
involving discovery abuse is Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Ass'n
v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993).
18. For discussion of the full range of adversarial excesses, see Marvin E. Frankel,
Partisan Justice (1980).
19. Frenkel et al., supra note 15, at 703.
20. Nelson, supra note 15, at 778; Sarat, supra note 15, at 828.
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dialogue and firms are motivated to please clients, the relative
autonomy of the outside law firm lawyer has shrunk radically from the
idealized model of wise counselor to the purveyor of technical services
on behalf of narrowly defined client interests.
The Litigation Section study finds that lawyers in high-stakes cases
operate by a default rule of toughness.2 The "culture" of large law
firms, cited by partners, is not detectable to associates, who lack any
clue of its content except that one is rewarded for being tough (e.g.,
not revealing a harmful document if there is a hint of plausibility to a
claim that the document is privileged or was not requested with
sufficient precision). On the other hand, an associate who raises
ethical or moral questions may be treated as a troublemaker, and
producing a harmful document when a partner or the client thinks
that an argument could be made for non-production may be fatal to
promotion.' Incentives and rewards are all aligned to the default
position of "be tough."
Hyper-adversarialism is not our only problem. Even though our
society is more affluent than it was a generation ago and the ratio of
lawyers to population is much larger, access to justice on the part of
lower income or poor Americans is little better (and perhaps worse
for those below the poverty line). From 1975 to 1995, the portion of
the profession that serves business clients has grown substantially in
numbers and earnings. During the same period, solo practitioners and
small firm lawyers serving individual clients lost ground in earnings
while also increasing in numbers.' Increased competition in legal
service markets has improved the variety and quality of many services
offered to middle-class and upper-class Americans, but has provided
little help for the poor. In some respects the access problems are
worse than they were twenty-five years ago, when the profession was
much smaller in size but more resources, in real dollar terms, were
devoted to publicly-funded legal assistance.24 Access problems clearly
21. Sarat, supra note 15, at 819 ("[B]eing 'tough' and being ready to fight for the
interests of their client is ... the first prerequisite to being a good lawyer. 'Tough,' as
one judge observed about the behavior of lawyers in litigation, 'is the default
position."').
22. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 718 ("An associate who raises an ethical
objection, or even just a question, about what a partner or client wants is taking a risk
of being perceived as a difficult or obstructive person .... An associate whose ethical
fastidiousness poses the risk of displeasing or even losing a client will not last long.").
23. See Conference Proceedings, Professionalism From a Social Science
Perspective, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 473, 478 (2001) (remarks of Robert L. Nelson)
(summarizing the findings of the 1995 update of the Chicago Lawyers study).
24. Two examples come readily to mind: (1) funding of indigent criminal defense
is scandalous (the federal rate of $75 per hour has been in effect since 1986 and most
states provide an even lower rate of compensation); and (2) federal funding of civil
legal assistance for the poor is currently at about the same dollar level reached in the
1980 appropriation, about $300 million. The 1980 figure, in current dollars, would be
worth $646,238,000, indicating that funding has gone down more than fifty percent
while the population needing service has substantially increased. See Rhode, Interests
[Vol. 701604
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need a fresh look. The problems are legion and I worry that the
entrenched attitudes and views of the organized bar will continue to
stand in the way of measures that would improve either (1) the
excesses of the adversarial system, (2) the accountability of lawyers to
clients, third parties or the courts, or (3) the continuing problems of
access to justice. The high court judges who largely regulate the legal
profession are primarily engaged in adjudication; when they shift hats
to perform the executive and legislative functions of regulating
lawyers and administering professional discipline, they tend to reflect
the entrenched attitudes, interests and constant influence of the
organized bar. In violation of the American commitment to
separation of powers, other branches of government are largely
excluded. The closed system may ultimately require legislative
rebellion in the states and federal legislative preemption if needed
reforms are to be considered and adopted.
In an earlier article I surveyed the problems ordinary Americans
have in obtaining competent legal services at reasonable cost.,
Nearly everything said there in terms of greater accountability of
lawyers and improved access to legal services remains true seven years
later. It is worth noting that even problems that appear to be
amenable of solution are little improved. For example, consider the
frequent situations in which a lawyer steals client funds from the
lawyer's trust account. Professional discipline has been firm and
unyielding in punishing such egregious intentional wrongs. But what
about those whose property has been stolen? Every jurisdiction has a
client protection fund providing reimbursement for some of these
lawyer thefts, but everyone agrees that the reimbursement is slow and
inadequate.26 A few states use random audits of lawyer trust accounts,
a step that is effective in deterring misconduct and catching those
lawyers who violate this basic trust. No state requires lawyers to
obtain a fidelity bond covering loss or embezzlement of client funds.
Why don't all states solve the problem by adopting random audit
procedures and requiring lawyers to obtain fidelity bonds to cover the
amounts commonly held in the lawyer's trust account? The treasurers
of banks and other organizations, public and private, are routinely
covered by fidelity bonds at modest cost.
My earlier article discusses a broad range of issues and makes a
large number of recommendations. Here I confine myself to two
related issues: first, deterring abusive litigation conduct by
modifications in the adversary system and greater use of judicial
of Justice, supra note 9, at 124-25.
25. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 531 (1994).
26. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 555-56. As of 1998, only four
states did not have limits on reimbursement.
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sanctions in proceedings; and second, improving the accountability of
lawyers to clients, courts and third persons.
A. Modifying the Adversary Sytem to Combat Hyper-Adversarialism
The American addiction to an extreme form of the adversarial
system needs serious attention and reform. The three key concerns
are (1) hyper-adversarialism, (2) the subordination of fair, truthful
and cost-efficient outcomes, and (3) the dominance of money, lawyer
ego and winning.
Hyper-adversarialism expresses the norm that appears to govern
American lawyers in high-stakes, complex litigation: a vision of
lawyering that puts an expansive spin on Lord Brougham's classic but
flawed statement of an advocate's role. Brougham stated:
An [advocate's first and only duty is to] save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons... he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others... [but] go on reckless of consequences
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in
confusion. 27
In short, a lawyer should be a diligent partisan for her client, but she
should also be amoral or immoral with respect to courts or third
persons. A dutiful lawyer should regard everything not clearly
forbidden by law as required if it serves the client's interest. Nor is it
the lawyer's job to express moral concerns to the client in an effort to
change the client's goals or means. The lawyer seeks to win for the
client whatever the consequences to the institutions of law or the
effects on third persons. This is the modern disease of hyper-
adversarialism.
Of course, many things that are perfectly legal are immoral and
wrong. Self-interested actions that erode the social fabric of trust and
legitimacy will ultimately produce a society in which none of us wants
to live.2
27. Quoted in Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 580 (1986). In the
situation in which Lord Brougham was involved in 1820 (defending Queen Caroline,
who was charged with adultery in a legislative divorce proceeding initiated by King
George IV), a veiled reference to the indiscretions of the King was called for. Today,
however, it suggests that a lawyer should take steps in a client's interest even though
those steps will undermine the legitimacy and soundness of the administration ofjustice. In effect, Brougham's warning to the opposing party-who happened to be
the King of the Realm-is viewed, erroneously, as a statement that lawyers have no
responsibility to courts, third parties or the public other than the avoidance of clearly
unlawful conduct. See David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 188-89 (1973).
28. See Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in Ethics in
Practice 42 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). Gordon argues that "lawyers' work on
behalf of clients positively requires-both for its justification and its successful
functioning for the benefit of those same clients in the long run-that lawyers also
help maintain and refresh the public sphere, the infrastructure of law and cultural
[Vol. 701606
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In the small-stakes matters that make up the bulk of civil litigation,
clients cannot afford hyper-adversarialism and it is relatively rare. It
is also usually absent in any criminal case involving an indigent
defendant or one of moderate means. (As suggested earlier, these
areas of practice are characterized by other serious problems of
inadequate representation that deserve attention.) But scorched-
earth litigation tactics prevail when one or both sides can afford them
and the stakes are high. Information is marshaled competitively and
unfavorable evidence is suppressed if possible.29 Advantages in
resources or ability are exploited; as one wag said with the criminal
context in mind, "money talks and O.J. walks." Trial lawyers
increasingly do not recognize any responsibility for the sound
functioning of the justice system or for the correctness or fairness of
outcomes. "Ethics" becomes a matter of steering just clear of the
unambiguous and enforced pronouncements in the law governing
lawyers. The language of morality has no place; standards are viewed
as external and as defined solely by legal rules and their potential
enforcement.
The lack of interest in truthful outcomes threatens the long-term
faith that the American people have in the legitimacy of the justice
system. As Jonathan Harr said in his masterful description of one
mass tort action:
Each trial is... a morality play watched by a public audience.
"Through trials, society seeks not only to discover the truth about a
past event, but also to forge a link between ... wrong and liability."
The judgments of the courts are meant to reinforce social rules and
values and, at the same time, to deter behavior contrary to those
rules and values. To achieve this end, the public has to believe that
jury verdicts are statements about the truth of actual events, not
convention that constitute the cement of society." Id. He treats the "legal-social
framework" as a "common good," which can be destroyed by self-interested behavior.
Id. at 46. "Lawyers have to help preserve the commons-to help clients comply with
the letter and purpose of the frameworks of law and custom that sustain them
all...."Id. at47.
29. The ABA Section of Litigation study discussed earlier suggests that discovery
abuse and document concealment are increasingly common practices. See, eg.,
Nelson, supra note 15, at 774. The major case study, Report, Ethics: Beyond the
Rules, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 691, app. at 885-86 (1998), was based on Washington State
Physicians Ins. Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993), in
which Bogle & Gates exercised elaborate and undisclosed casuistry to interpret
discovery requests as not requiring two "smoking gun" documents. See 858 P.2d at
1080. In that case, fourteen prominent litigators and academic experts testified that
Bogle & Gates had done nothing wrong-the firm did only what was common
practice in civil litigation today. The Washington court imposed a $325,000 sanction,
which was followed a few years later with an even larger one for similar conduct in
another case. When the firm dissolved in 2000, the ethics violations were mentioned
as one contributing factor. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, Am. Law., Apr.
1994, at 5.
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mere probabilities. If that belief is ever lost, a society based on the
rule of law would ultimately collapse into anarchy.30
Hyper-adversarialism prevails in high-stakes cases, however,
because it serves the pocket books and egos of lawyers. The large
attorney's fees earned by plaintiffs' lawyers reflect the great skill and
effort they expend on these cases. Defense lawyers receive
comparable sums: the hourly meter is running at a high rate and
driving the discovery games, pre-trial motions, elaborate coaching of
witnesses and almost endless cross-examination. It is not surprising
that victorious tort victims receive only a small share of the total
expense of such litigation.31 Economists say that the situation is a
classic prisoner's dilemma problem. The massive and matching
expenditures of both sides are not in the best interests of either the
parties or the public, and the inability of the parties to cooperate in
keeping transaction costs down results in each spending additional
amounts that are offset by the increased spending of the opposing
party.32
Under this analysis, if resources and abilities are equally matched,
outcomes are largely unchanged but come at great cost to the parties,
the court system and the public. But often resources and abilities are
not equally matched and equal justice under the law becomes an
illusion. Hence, the rule of law is threatened by the growing public
recognition that the rich fare better in the civil and criminal courts
than do those with less wealth. All of us agree that a person's wealth
ought not be one of the factors determining liability or severity of
punishment, and that we should strive to minimize the advantages of
wealth. As Lloyd Weinreb has said, even if some wealth-based
disparity is an inevitable concomitant of a private bar, "[i]t is quite
another thing to let the decisions of lawyers privately retained and
compensated so overwhelm the criminal process that the influence of
wealth is palpable and pervasive. '33
30. Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action 236 (1995).
31. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1281-84 (1992)
(summarizing the cost-of-litigation studies of the Rand Institute of Civil Justice). The
studies indicate that in automobile negligence litigation, the plaintiff receives about
one-half of the award and the other one-half pays attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses. In asbestos litigation, less than forty percent of the award was received by
plaintiffs with the remainder constituting transaction costs. Rand estimates that the
total cost of tort litigation in 1985 was about $29 to $36 billion; of that total, more than
half was spent on transaction costs and about $14 to $16 million was received by
injury victims. When insurance costs of $35 million are added, the division of the total
tort system cost of $68 billion is as follows: insurers (fifty-one percent), lawyers
(twenty-seven percent) and injured victims (twenty-three percent). See id. at 1282.
32. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 432-34 (summarizing the
game theory view of high-stakes litigation as a "prisoners' dilemma").
33. Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Adversary Process Is Not an End in Itself, 2 J. Inst. for
Study Legal Ethics 59, 62 (1999).
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The adversarial process has become an end in itself. Trials have
become sporting contests in which the lawyers are on center stage and
everyone else (the parties, the court, the jury) is barely visible. The
required arts or tricks of persuasion -extensive coaching of witnesses,
suppression of unfavorable evidence, the dust in the eyes that comes
from questions that assume facts the lawyer knows are untrue or
unprovable, and so on-are constantly testing the limits of the law and
come perilously close to deliberate distortion and concealment. As
one prominent defense lawyer said, "The truth? ... The truth is at the
bottom of a bottomless pit."'  The search for truth is often
overwhelmed by obfuscation and concealment.
These comments should not be taken as a plea to abandon the right
of parties to participate in and substantially control civil litigation.
But the adversarial system should be modified in ways that will serve
the goals of the justice system: the accurate, efficient and fair
resolution of disputes. Lawyers should be passionately committed to
advancing their client's interests. However, steps should be taken to
civilize the process in ways that will be more likely to let the truth
emerge, reduce transaction costs, and maintain the integrity of judicial
institutions and procedures.
A starting point would be a study of the experience of those
jurisdictions that have taken the following notable steps in this
direction:35
* requiring up-front disclosure of information relevant to
claims and defenses;'
" requiring that contentions be well-grounded in fact and
warranted in law;37
* sanctioning lawyer or party conduct that violates procedural
rules;
* allowing jurors to be more active participants (for example,
by taking notes and asking questions of witnesses).
Further modifications of the adversarial system should be
considered and studied.' Here are a few suggestions:
* Reduce adversarial histrionics by requiring lawyers, like
everyone else in the courtroom, to remain seated at all
times. An atmosphere that is concerned with the merits of
the case rather than that of a contest between lawyers is
more likely to reach fair and truthful results.
* Require lawyers to disclose in advance any evidence that
34. Harr, supra note 30, at 340.
35. Arizona, for example, has adopted all of the measures listed.
36. Compare the half-hearted and soon-abandoned requirements of Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
37. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
38. For suggestions concerning criminal trials, see Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L Rev. 403 (1992).
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raises admissibility questions so that these issues are
handled, before the trial, out of the presence of the jury.
* Permit only one lawyer per side to participate at any given
time.
* Exercise more judicial control of cross-examination and
foreclose any argument that seeks to introduce falsity by
stating premises for which no admissible evidence has been
disclosed or offered 9
" Police the extent to which witness coaching has the effect of
creating a coordinated or fabricated story."
* Finally, and most importantly, provide the courts with
sufficient personnel and resources to intervene earlier, more
often and more forcefully to settle discovery disputes and
sanction tactics of concealment, delay or other abuse.
B. Making Lawyers More Accountable for Their Conduct
Mechanisms for making lawyers accountable to clients, courts and
third persons start with the conscience of the individual lawyer and
the informal peer review of the practice unit and of professional
colleagues more generally. Individual conscience is alive and well
with a minority of lawyers, but is subverted for the profession as a
whole by the rewards and incentives of practice within law firms and
by the ideology of hyper-adversarialism. Professionalism or civility
codes will have little substantial effect on current abuses of
adversarialism, which are driven by deeply ingrained attitudes of
adversarial duty that are economically and psychologically rewarding
to trial lawyers in a society that is increasingly self-interested rather
than public-interested. Consequently, serious attention must be given
to improving accountability through formal sanctions: professional
discipline, sanctions in proceedings, and civil liability.
Lawyers fear the application of these sanctions. If there is a
likelihood one or more of them will be brought to bear, lawyer
behavior is affected. This explains why the organized bar is and has
been engaged in seeing to it that each of these sanctions has a
restricted role.
39. See, e.g., Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal
Within the Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 563 (1996); Carl
M. Selinger, The "Law" on Lawyer Efforts to Discredit Truthful Testimony, 46 Okla.
L. Rev. 99, 99-100 (1993) (arguing that such conduct may violate current ethics rules
and that, if not, the rules should be clarified to prohibit the practice).
40. See Witness Preparation Memos Raise Questions About Ethical Limits, 14
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 2, at 48, 48-53 (Feb. 18, 1998)
(discussing incidents in which witness preparation raised questions about ethical
limits); Lester Brickman & Ronald Rotunda, When Witnesses Are Told What to Say,
Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1998, at A15.
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1. Professional Discipline
Under present resource limitations and the often ambiguous
standards of ethics rules, professional discipline has little or no role in
preventing misconduct in litigation and only a limited role in
protecting clients in other contexts. Discipline fails to deal with many
of the issues most important to clients: the competence of a lawyer's
work for a client is left to the possibility of a legal malpractice action;
the appropriateness of the legal fee is left to the market place or to
arbitration by a bar-created process; failures of communication are
left unattended except as an add-on to more serious ethics violations;
and abusive litigation practices are not addressed because the
standards expressed in the applicable rules are stated in ambiguous
generalities and hence are unenforceable.4"
The organized bar resists more specific requirements. The initiative
in this area must come from judges or legislators, who are more
willing to create such standards in procedure codes and, at least
sometimes, to enforce them once put in place. Standards embodied in
procedural rules and subsequently enforced can have a powerful
effect on lawyer conduct. The basic limitation, especially in
jurisdictions where judges are subject to frequent elections, is that
judges do not like to devote time to matters of lawyer conduct and
hate to criticize members of the bar.
2. Sanctions in Proceedings
Judges have inherent authority to punish an attorney's bad faith
conduct in litigation, of which contempt law is but one of the
ingredients. In addition, court decisions, procedural rules and statutes
in the federal courts and in many states empower a judge to order a
party and/or the party's lawyer to pay the legal fees of an adversary
oppressed by bad-faith litigation. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure moves beyond subjective bad faith and applies an
objective test to lawyer and party litigation abuse. As amended in
1993, Rule 11 requires that any assertion presented to the court
41. The ethics rules governing frivolous assertions, delay and harassment are
illustrative. Model Rule 3.1, dealing with "meritorious claims and contentions," uses
a double negative (an assertion is prohibited "unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous") and the Comment states an "action... is not frivolous merely
because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects
to develop vital evidence only by discovery." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.1 &
cmt. (1983). Compare the more rigorous requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Model Rule 3.2 prohibits the use of delaying tactics unless
"consistent with the interests of the client." R. 3.2. Model Rule 4.4 prohibits
harassment when the "means... have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . R..." . 4.4. Given the rules' ambiguity, it
is not surprising that they do not provide the basis for professional discipline of
abusive litigation conduct.
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certifies to the court "to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" that, among other things:
(1) [the representation] is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; [and] (2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law.42
A number of states have followed the federal lead in prohibiting
conduct that fails to meet either the objective standard of being
warranted by law or the subjective standard of improper purpose.
Other states require courts to make a finding of subjective bad faith
(similar to the pre-1983 federal rule), a requirement that limits the
effectiveness of the rule in controlling abusive litigation conduct. Still
other states, including New York, have no counterpart to Rule 11,
leaving abusive litigation conduct to vaguer and generally unenforced
boundaries of the ethics rules. Adoption of a rule based on the
federal model, and an increased willingness on the part of judges to
enforce existing rules, would be desirable steps in many states.
3. Civil Liability to Clients and Third Persons
Professional malpractice provides a useful deterrent to incompetent
lawyering despite its many limitations.4 3 Because malpractice cases
are strongly defended and difficult to prove, a malpractice specialist
will undertake a case only if the client's harm is large, the breach of
duty fairly clear, and the causal connection between breach and harm
can be established. Moreover, the malpractice remedy is meaningful
only if the lawyer has adequate malpractice insurance. A large
number of lawyers, perhaps as many as fifty percent in some states,
have no malpractice insurance coverage; these are also the lawyers
who are most unlikely to have substantial personal assets subject to
execution of a judgment. Every state should join Oregon in requiring
all lawyers in active practice to purchase malpractice coverage
sufficient to cover anticipated awards."
In my view, one of the welcome developments in recent years is the
broadening of the tort liability of lawyers to third persons who are
harmed in a fairly predictable manner by a lawyer's work for a client.
42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
43. See generally Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation
Malpractice Actions: Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37 San Diego L. Rev.
401 (2000); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
Rutgers L. Rev. 101 (1995).
44. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 172-74; see also Rhode,
Interests of Justice, supra note 9, at 165-68.
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Liability is most common where the lawyer has given a legal opinion
to facilitate a client transaction and the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the opinion will be relied upon by that person."
Liability is also developing in other situations lacking privity of
contract, such as when a lawyer's negligence in drafting testamentary
documents results in a harm to the intended beneficiaries. But many
jurisdictions restrict liability in numerous situations in which a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the work for a client is
intended to influence or benefit a third person." In these situations,
the client has not been injured (or is dead), and a denial of recovery to
the person who was the intended beneficiary means that estate
planners, for example, are not subject to the deterrent effect of any
enforceable standard of care.
It is ironic that a profession which opposes any restrictions on tort
liability for physicians or others is so worried about the application of
the negligence standard to itself.O Even more troubling is the trend to
exempt many criminal defense lawyers from malpractice liability.
Decisions in a number of states require that the convicted defendant
must establish actual innocence of the crime charged, even if the
lawyer's error, such as failure to seek the exclusion of illegally
45. Texas, apparently the only state in which a lawyer had no duty of care to a
person to whom the lawyer has given an opinion at the direction of the client to
facilitate a client transaction with that person, joined the parade in 1999. See
generally Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 88-92.
46. See e.g., Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 752 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a
lawyer who drafts a will owes a duty of care to intended beneficiaries). But see
Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a lawyer drafting a
trust instrument owes no duty of care to trust beneficiaries).
47. The leading case is Greycas, Inc v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.) (applying Illinois law). See also Restatement (Third) of The Law
Governing Lawyers § 51 (2000) (specifying a number of situations in which a lawyer
owes a duty of care to a nonclient).
48. One of the profession's responses to the threat of third-party liability has been
a successful push for the enactment of state legislation eliminating the traditional rule
that a law partner's assets are at risk when a firm member's negligence lead to a
malpractice or third-party award. In any setting in which lawyer professionalism is
discussed, the profession laments the decline of mentoring in law firms and urges
greater quality control measures. Yet it rejected the principles of monitoring, group
responsibility and quality control that underlie the traditional partnership rule.
Pocket-book interests have prevailed over "traditional professional values." Also, the
organized bar usually takes the position that state legislatures have no business
regulating the profession. But when the common law rule proved threatening, the bar
sought and obtained immediate legislative action in many states. For a review of this
subject, see Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawy.er Self-
Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. Tex. L Rev. 359 (1998) (arguing
that limited liability statutes should not be viewed by courts as invading their
exclusive "inherent" authority to regulate the profession; but, conversely, such
lawyer-protective legislation should be accompanied by requirements that law firms
carry adequate malpractice insurance).
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obtained evidence, probably would have resulted in a not-guilty
outcome.49
Malpractice liability is not a factor in deterring litigation misconduct
(unlike the role of third party liability in assuring care to third parties
who are influenced by, or the intended beneficiaries of, the lawyer's
work for a client on a business transaction). Abusive litigation
practices serve presumed or actual client interests. Even in situations
in which a lawyer's decisions harm the client by losing the case, most
courts apply a standard of care that gives a virtual immunity to
professional judgments or missteps in the course of litigation.0
Lawyer liability to third persons in a litigation context is close to non-
existent. There is no duty of care to the opposing party, hence no
negligence remedy; and intentional torts such as abuse of process and
malicious prosecution are rarely available against the opposing party's
lawyer even for pursuit of wholly frivolous claims.5 1 In order to curb
litigation misconduct, the intentional torts of abuse of process and
malicious prosecution should be applied to lawyers in the same
manner as they are to other agents. In addition, defamation immunity
should be restricted to speech in, or closely related to, courtroom
assertions.
My thesis is clear: In the absence of professional discipline,
sanctions in proceedings and adequate civil liability, lawyers are
insufficiently accountable to their clients, third persons and the courts.
Legislatures and courts should create standards that define prohibited
conduct as clearly as is feasible and misconduct should be punished by
appropriate techniques. In practice, civil liability and sanctions in
proceedings are likely to be the most effective remedies. The
perception is becoming widespread that outcomes in litigation
frequently turn as much on the aggressiveness and skills of the lawyers
and the resources available to them as they do on the merits of the
case. If this belief becomes thoroughly accepted, the American dream
of equal justice under law will become a bad joke, a mockery-a
shadow land in which truth and reality have only a vague presence.
We can and should do better!
49. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 201 n.62.
50. A small but growing number of jurisdictions permit a client to recover when
the lawyer rejects a settlement offer that the client would accept without
communicating it to the client. Since a clear violation of an important professional
duty is involved, liability in this situation is appropriate. See Model Rules of Prof'l
Responsibility R. 1.2(a), R. 1.4 (1983).
51. See Hazard, Koniak & Cramton, supra note 4, at 387-404.
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